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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As accustomed as we are to air travel today, it 
was only fifty~three years ago that man flew for the first 
time. It was a cold memorable December 17, 1903 when Orville 
Wright climbed into the radically new invention . that he and 
his brother had made,- the heavier than air machine. Though 
the distance flown was ·short, and the time aloft only twelve 
seconds, it was the start of a great American· industry -which 
has brought employment and profit to a great number of people. 
We have come a long .way since that first flight. 
The design of the airplane has changed· from ·the awkward 
bulky contraption built by the Wrights to the · sle·ek modern 
airliners of today. The size has changed from a s·ingle-
seater to giants of today that carry a hundred passengers. 
· The propelling force has changed from a single cylinder 
engine· to the turbo-jets and jet engines of · the present. 
Some engineers are even forecasting atomi.c powered engines 
within the forseeable future. 
At first, air enthusiasts were interested mostly 
in developing the a:irplane as a machine. Many of the first 
who flew, flew for the sport of it, - more as a hobby. They 
gave· little thought to ita economic possibilities. 
In 1918, the United States Post Office established 
the first airmail route. This appears to be the beginning 
of_ -commercial flying. In 1921, the New York-San Francisco 
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route was established. These activities were given over 
by the government to private enterprise by passage of the 
Kelly Act in 1925. It was ten years after the establishment 
of the airmail r.outes before serious considerat·ton ·was 
given to putting the airplane· to commercial use· by flying 
passengers and freight. A.tf'1rst, people were naturally 
cautious about taking trips by air. However, businessmen 
soon found they could save ·valuable time by flying• They 
could transport perishable goods and fill rush orders more 
rapidly by the use of air freight. By the start of the 
Second World War, flying was an accep·ted means of travel. 
The use as well as the ·types of planes was great1y advanced 
by the War. Since the War, there have been more tremendous 
strides until we are now in the "jet age" of air travel. 
With all this rapid advance, there has also come 
Federal regulation. Varioue ·methods of control of non-
military flying were tried. The most important and · current 
regulation was the result of' the passing of' the Lea-McCarren 
Civil Aeronautics Authority. In 1940, this Authority was 
divided into two bureaus, the Civil Aeronautics Board and 
the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Both come under the 
jurisdiction of' the Department of Commerce. The Civil 
Aeronautic·s Board supervisee all aconomie aspects of' air-
line operation. It decid·es which airline should be certified 
for what route, and when and if parallel. routes are needed. 
It decides what rates should be charged and ·generally con-
-trols pompeti tion. It sets the standards for pilots, safety 
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regulations., and investigates accidents . It sets and main-
tains the standards for business records ·, publishing them 
periodically .• The Civil Aeronautics Administratlon is 
responsible for · enforcing the air regulat.1ons· set up by 
the Civil Aeronautics Board. It is also · tn charge of main-
taining Federal airways, promoting airport development, 
and carrying on special studies. 
At first, the Civil Aeronautics Board ' se.emed to 
follow a policy that limited competition. This was to get 
some of the airlines firmly on their feet, and has led to 
the rise of four major lines. Theseairlines dominate the 
domestic field and account . for about 70 perc·ent of the 
passengers, mail, and property . carried. They are American 
Airlines-; United Airlines, Eastern Airlines, and Trans-
World Airlines. There are six intermediate lines .which 
carry a combined total of about 25 percent. They include 
Braniff Airways, Capital Airlines, Delta Airlines, National 
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Western Airlines. The 
rest is carried by t\';o small lines, Continental Airlines 
and Northeast Airlines. Lately, however, the policy or the 
Civil Aeronautics Board seems to be reversed. It is in-
creasing competition and building up some o-f the smaller 
lines with the intention of getting them off subsidy. 
Such a policy is indicated by the granting of some fina'bi-
,.,_ 
ally lucrative routes to some of the small lines, partic-
ularly where they are paro.llel routes. 
Investment .money was not readily forthcoming in 
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the early days of commer·eial aviation. Thus, subsi'dies were 
introduced. This made the airlines more stable financially, 
and investors felt more inclined to inv·est in them. An added 
margin of safety was given to the investor with the passage 
of the Civil Aeronautics Act, thereby cietting up standards 
of accounting and some financial regulation. Yet, until 
recently many of the big investors such as .insurance companies 
stayed away from airline stocks. Recently though, many in-
surance companies have taken the lead in the financing of 
jet planes for the airlines. 
What will be the future investment possibilities 
of the airlines? The purpose of this thesi's is to present 
some facts and informa·tton that will give a reasonably 
accurate answer, - despite the hazards of forecasting. For 
the sake of simplicity, this thesis will be limited to the 
twelve domestic airlines. 
First, this thesis will discuss jet planes and 
their problems, as jetswill play animportant role in the 
growth of the airlines, and are a vital key to the financial 
future of these airlines. Because the initial .cost of a 
jet, which is two to three times that of a piston-type 
plane, is so high, the airlines will have to make changes 
in their finances. The problem of paying for jets as well 
.as other cost factors will be develop__ed. 
In the e. ~cond place, other factors regarding air 
travel such as attitudes,_,.increase 1.n passenger traffic, 
competition, and subsidies will be discussed. Attitudes 
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are important, for if the public will not ac·cept air travel, 
the industry will fail. Passenger traffic is expe·cted to 
grow, and forecasts are presented to indicate this growth • 
. Such growth is important as it will present problems or 
various kinds. Competi t1on has · been of two types, in·ternal 
or between the airlines, and external or competition for 
the disposable dollar. Practically every airline has been 
on subsidy at some time or other, and the future use of 
subsidies will be discussed later. 
Thirdly, the the·sis · will deal with the twelve 
companies individually:; -bring:tng -out some of the more 
important operating · and financial facts ·, bearing on- invest-
ment possibilities. When stock is purchased, it is the 
security of the. individual company that is bought, not the 
industry as a whole, therefore, the company analysis is 
important. 
Finally, this thests will present s·ome views 
about airline stocks, and whether they are worth holding 
or buying. 
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CHAPTER II 
JET .PLANES .AND . THEIR EFFECT ON AIRLINES 
Competi t1on# being as fiere.e as it is in the 
airline industry, the jet age has been · introduced · sooner 
than many airline· managements ·would have . liked;. The larger 
airlines placed orders for jet planes-, so that they would 
have anadvantage in this competition. The smaller lines, 
in turn, have had to order them to keep up with the .compet-
ition. Mos-t managements feel that jet planes are the answer 
to a greatmany problema, and wil l help the airlines grow 
to a posi 'tion o-f leadership in the field of transportation. 
United Airlines was the firstmajor domestic 
airline te order. · jet planes. They plac.ed an order in 1955 
with Douglas ·Aircraft for thirty Douglas -DC•8 transports. 
This was at an estimated cost of $175,000.,000. Now, ten 
of the domestic airlines have · placed orders for some type 
of jet plane, either the turbopropjet, or the full jet 
(turbojet). Capital Airlines had an order for 35 Viscounts 
and 14 Comets. However, after some of the Viscounts had 
been received in 1956 and 1957, the balance of the order 
was cancelled. The 14 Comets were cancelled also. The 
reason was inability to finance them while profits were 
declining. Northwest Airlines has no jet planes on order. 
Table # 1 lists the domestic airlines and their 
# This word will be defined and explained in Chap_ter III. 
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jet orders by make, based on a compilation by Standard and 
Poor's. Domestic Airlines alone have on order 312 jets 
worth about one and a half billion dollars. 
Table # 1 
JET TRANSPORTS ON ORDER 
Bristol Lockheed Viscounts .Convair Boeing Douglas 
Britannia Electra 707 DC-8 
American 35 30 
Braniff 9 5 
Continental 15 4 
Delta 10 8 
Eastern 40 20 
National 23 6 
Northeast 5 
T. W. A. 30 33 
United 30 
Western 9 
As of ;May 1957 
Source: 
10 
Standard and Poor's Indus try Survey: Air Transpo.rt November 14, 1957 
How do jete compare with standard aircraft now 
in use? Speed, of course;, is one of the biggest, if not 
the bigge·et asset of a jet plane. Jet aircrat't will cruise 
at a speed of about 550•600 -milee per hour. This is almost 
twice as fast as the cruising speed of currentlyueed 
piston-type planes. Jets will make the world forty percent 
smaller .• Flying time on a coast to coast flight will be 
cut from over · s ev·en hours to about . four and. a half hours • * 
Costs are an important element in trytng to evalu-
ate the effect of Jets on the airlines. There are few facts 
and figures available on such coste because jete are new 
to commercial flying. Most of the available information 
is speculative. 
In current operations, using piston-type planes, 
the airlines are facing rising costs in wages, fuel, and 
equipment. In their · annual reports and in government reports 
that are available, these costs are not broken down. Costs 
in these reports are listed in six major categories: flying 
operations., ground operations, maintenance and repairs, 
general and administrative, depreciation, and one that in-
cludes sales, advertising, publicity, and passenger service. 
Some reports split this last grouping into two or three 
headings. 
Jet operations will affect some of these categories 
more than others. For example, general and administrative, 
*6, P-~-· 9 
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sales, advert1,.~.lng; · and passenger service ·are all dependent 
on the size of operation. Their cost would not rise appreci-
ably with · the conversion to jets. Such co·sts are usually held 
to · a. small percentage of total operating costs. Any increase 
would be the result- of increases in ·wages · and costs of 
supplies that come with the general ·trend · of rising prices 
that has been .prevalent in this country the last ten to 
fifteen years. 
Other expense · items will be affected by j.et planes. 
The most obvious is depreciation. Depreeiatlon expense is 
used for financing . new.· planes, and ·problems concerning it 
will be discussed later in this chapter. For no~'~ , it is 
sufficient to say that . there . will be ·· an obvious · increase 
in depreciation cos'ts. As.suming· a piston--type plane worth 
about 2.2 million dollars was granted a fas·t amortization 
certificate, there would be a depreciation charge of about 
$350,000. Now, assuming a jet .plane is deprecia·ted without 
the fast write-off, a six million dollar plane would have 
a depreciat1on cost of #540,000. With a 5 year certificate, 
it would be #960,000. This increasein depreciation would 
mean lower profits as far a·s ·· the. financial . reports . are 
concerned;. But many ·investors do not · look at jus.t the 
prot'its, but also the .depreciation, aware thatdepreciation 
expense is retained within the company and increases the 
cash flow. 
The. expense incurred by the actual flying oper-
ations is-. the bigge.st expense of the airlines. Included 
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in this item are fuel costs and wages for the .flight crew. 
The cost of aviation fuel has just about · doubled 
since 1949. Currently, there is a tax .of two cents per 
gallon levied by the Federal Government on aviation fuel, 
and there is a proposal that this be increased to three 
and a half cents per gallon.* Jets, however, will not use 
expensive high octane aviation fuel, .but a cheaper fuel, 
similar to kerosene.** The cost of suc·h fuel is not avail-
able, but undoubtedly, it will not be as inexpensive as 
kerosene. Furthermore, the demand for jet fuel may cause 
the price to rise, and the actual cost will depend on 
supply and demand. Jet planes will burn more fuel, but 
with the cheaper fuel, it would not cost more to fly the 
plane.** With increased capacity, this would result in a 
cheaper fuel cost per seat mile. Another consideration is 
the proposed Federal tax on jet fuel, starting at three 
and a half cents per gallon, and increasing . to six and 
a half cents by 1963.* 
It is expected that the wage expense of flying 
jets will be increased for several reasons. There has been 
a general rise in wages in almost all fields in the past 
ten years, and with many labor contracts calling for year-
ly increases, such a trend is expected to continue. Even 
* 3, P• 2 
** 13, p. 159 
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without a trend of rising wage costs, the airlines would 
be faced with increased .wage costs as the Air Line Pilots 
Association is trying to get an increase; over and above 
the regular pilots' pay, for those who fly jets. There is 
also another major problem in conn.ection ·with the crew on 
a jet plane, and that is a 11 fight" over the third man in 
the cockpit. Under present regulations, only planes with 
four engines and over 80,000 pounds have to have a third 
person in the cockpit.* Many of the planes in current 
service are not this large. Where a third man is needed at 
present, it is usually a flight engineer. The jet planes 
will be large enough to require this. third man, and the 
Air Line Pilots' Association · is arguing for a third man. 
The outcome will not be known until new labor contracts 
are drawn up just prior to ac·tual use of the .jets. It may 
result in "feather-bedding", as has happened on the rail-
roads, but no matter what the outcome, . it will result in 
higher wage costs to the airlines• A survey for the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics indicates there will be a greater . 
need for pilots when jets are used' be.cause , the number of 
hours a pilot can fly a month is limited. With more planes 
in service, it is expected by this survey that the demand 
for pilots will increase, and this will increase the wage 
costs. 
It will also have to be determined with the in-
*19, P• 1348 
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troduction of jets, whether any increase in the number of 
hostesses· per flight will be necessary or not. The largest 
planes currently in use carry only ninety persons, but the 
Boeing 707 jet will be capable of carrying one hundred 
forty-six passengers. Can the same number of hostesses 
.service an increased number of passengers,· and would the 
union permit it? 
Not only are jet planes more expensive, but they 
are larger and more complex. The principle of a jet motor 
is supposed to be simpler · than a piston motor, but the jet 
planes will have more elaborate pressurizing and air-con-
ditioning systems, and more c·omplex electronic equipment. 
This is .expected to require more maintenance hours per 
flight than present planes need; thus increasing ·the size 
of the ground crews. An increase in the size .of the crews 
will increase the wage costs. 
Jet planes have an estimated .range of from 
3,500 to 4,000 miles. There will be more long-range, through 
flights, thus eliminating some of the costly and time con-
suming fuel stops. 
Because of faster flying time, a simple jet 
plane will be able to make more flights than a piston-type 
plane. One airline figures that its jete will be able to 
make three tripe for every two now being made.* Also, the 
jete will have an increase in capacity to three seats for 
*6, p. 9 
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every two now available. With larger, faster planes will 
there be a reduction in flights? This would be controlled 
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. With no reduction 1n service, 
would faster planes mean a reduction in the number of planes 
needed? 
While specific . facts and figures . ·on costs of' jet 
opera tiona ·· are not available, the above · f'actor·s must be 
considered, and no doubt, there will be an increase in the 
cost of jet operations. 
It has been estimated, quite accurately, that 
it cost 2.5 cents per· seat mile to take a. piston-type plane 
aloft. Boeing Aircraft est.imates that it will cost only 
1.8 cents per seat mile to fly a Boeing 707, a saving of 
25 %.* Similar estimates have been made by other manufac-
turers. Just what factors are included in these estimates 
is unknown, but from other figures on actual cost per seat 
mile flown by the airlines, it seems that these figures 
are based on current wage and · estimated fUel costs. 
It must be remembered that a lower cost per seat 
mile is the result of a higher load factor. For an airline 
to be profitable, obviously the actual load factor has to 
&xceed the break-even ,load factor. The question arises in 
converting to jets, will changes in costs produce any real 
change in the break-even· load factor and .which way. 
Estimates indicate that jets will have a lower break-even 
load factor, due to increased capacity. 
* 13, p.l59 
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Mr. Patterson, president of the United Airlines, 
claims in a report prepared by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Beane, that a jet will cost 14 % less to operate and at 
the same time do. three and a half times the work of a 
pist~n-type plane. 
Most of the turbojets will be large planes, while 
the modified jet, the turboprop jet, will be mostly a medium 
sized plane. The large turbojets will be used primarily 
for the long-haul flights. It is felt by most managements 
that the original cost will make them impractical for short 
hauls. The modified jet is ideal for short or medium hauls, 
as it gives the speed and shorter flying time without the 
size and high initial cost of the turbojet .• 
Flying in a jet plane will be a new and thrilling 
experience. Most noticeable difference will be the absence 
of almost all of the vibrations felt in today•s planes. 
On take-off, they just glide down the runway and lift eo 
smoothly into the air. While cruising, there is no vibration 
from the pounding of the piston engines and propeller blades. 
Though they can climb and descend rapidly, there is no sharp 
sensation, - just smoothness. Noise inside the plane will 
be almost eliminated. Just a slight hum. The engines will 
have sound-proofing and noise suppressors built in. Jets 
will fly at an altitude of six to eight miles, but the 
passenger will never realize it, because of pressurized 
cabins and air conditioners. 
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One of the major problems facing the airlines 
today with the ordering of jets is the matter of financing 
them. The initial cost will be almost three · times the cost 
of present-day planes. A DC-70, for example, co·sts about 
. 2.2 million dollars. Th.e. current cost ·of a jet is about 
5.5 to 6 million dollars. Obviously, the purchase of even 
a few jet planes will place a tremendous financial burden 
on the managements of the airlines. 
The piston-type plane was usually paid for out 
of cash accumulations, depreciation; sale of old .planes, 
small amounts of equity financing, or short term debt 
financing. However; the cost ·of a jet plane, including 
parts, and the training of pilots,is too much for these 
methods. As a result, the airlines are turning to debt 
financing of a long-term nature to ·pay for the jets. Most 
of them are turning to insurance companies or groups of 
banks for funds. They are not exp-eriencing too much diffi-
culty in getting loans from insurance companies, which 
seems to indicate confidence on the part of these lenders 
that the companies will be able to repay the loans. 
United Airlines has made arrangements for loans 
from two sources. There is a group of three insurance 
companies that will buy 120 million dollars of 4 percent 
debentures as needed. These companies are Prudential 
Insurance Company of America, Mutual Life Insurance Company 
of New York, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 
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A syndicate of 38 banks, headed by the First National City 
bank of New York has been formed and is making available 
credit amounting to 30 million dollars. This credit will 
be available until December 31, 1960. The bank credit must 
be paid off five years after date of borrowing. The debent-
ures must be paid off in 25 years, (1981). United Airlines 
has on order 30 jet planes, with an estimated cost of 175 
million dollars. Their arrangements for loans amounts to 
only 150 million dollars. Therefore, it should be expected 
that they will have to borrow these funds shortly after 
planes start arriving. If all were borrowed within two or 
three years, it would mean ~ about 11 million dollars a year 
would have to be paid off or put into a sinking fund, apart 
from interest. 
Eastern Airlines has made arrangements to borrow 
90 million dollars from Equitable Life Assurance Society 
at 3.75 percent interest. It has already drawn the first 
50 million dollars to retire short term debts and make 
payments on new aircraft. The rest of the loan, 40 million 
dollars, is to be applied to the purchase of 4o Lockheed 
Electra turboprop planes. None of this loan is going to 
turbo jet planes. Eastern has 20 Douglas DC-8 jet planes on 
order, but will seek other funds from banks or insurance 
companies when the time comes. The total estimated cost 
of both type planes is 240 million dollars, so here again, 
a large chunk of earnings has got to go into a sinking 
fund to pay off the long term debt. 
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American Airlines has made arrangements ·for its 
financing with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. This 
loan is for seventy-five millian dollars, at four percent. 
A s ink_ing fund is required beginning in 1967, and the full 
amount is not due until 1996. American Airlines has the 
longest time in which to pay back its loan. This would be 
roughly three million dollars going into the sinking fund 
each year on.ce it starts. 
Braniff Airways 1s planning to issue up to forty 
million dollars of 4.75% equipment mortgage .sink.ing fund 
bonds. These bonds will be due in July 1976, being twenty 
year bonds. This would mean roughly two million ·per ·year 
plus interest out of revenues. There are several insurance 
companies that have pledged to purchase these bonds, in 
installments, until 1961. These companies include Mutual 
Life Insurance Company o.f New York, Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the United Stat·es, Prudential Insurance Company 
of America, New England Mutual Life II,lsurance · Company, 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Connecticut 
General Life Insurance Company, and Conn.ecticut Mutual Life 
Insurance Company. 
While figures and plans for all companies are 
not available at this time, it is easy to see what the 
future holds. Long term financing is necessary for all these 
companies. The length of the loan varies from five years on 
bank borrowings to 20, 25, or 30 years on debentures. Rates 
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vary, of course, depending on the financial condition of 
the airline and time involved. But it is evident that, no 
matter what the terms, a goodly-sized portion of revenues 
is going into sinking funds to pay back these loans. This 
will tend to postpone immediate profits from jet planes. 
Depreciation also has much to do with the amount 
of cash available for financing the new jets. It is an ex-
pense item as far as taxes and profits are concerned, and 
yet, in other respects, is like added cash to the companies. 
Planes currently in use have been depreciated in 
one of two ways. F~rst, many were depreciated over the 
average life expectancy of seven years, with a 10 % residual 
value. The other way was under rapid amortization, as set 
up and granted by the Office of Defense Mobilization. Under 
this plan, the companies were allowed a fast five-year 
write-off on 80 % of cost. This was allowed because the 
government wanted to increase the carrying capacity of the 
airlines in the interest of national defense. They set a 
goal of 900 planes, which was reached about a year ago, 
at which time, the O.D.M. clamped down on the issuance of 
rapid amortization certificates. At that time, there were 
applications for over 1.4 billion dollars of fast write-offs. 
But the rapid depreciation device is more im-
portant to the airlines in the jet age than before. First, 
the dollar volume involved is much greater. Secondly, the 
life expectation of a jet is projected to be ten years, 
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instead of the seven years on . piston~type planes• The five 
year plan would about double the cash raising ability of 
the depreciation expense, and would greatly affect the 
financing plans of the airlines. 
The airlines have contested the O.D.M. stand. 
The Air Transport Ass.ocia tion, which represents the air-
lines, believes the O.D.M. should and will recognizethe 
need of additional jets for use in case of national emer-
gency, and again issue the rapid amortization certificates. 
There is still another possibility to aid the 
airlines in the purchasing of jets. That is the issuance 
of equipment trust certificates, as used by the railroads. 
In September 1957, President Eisenhower signed legislation 
aimed at making it easier for airlines to mak.e use of these 
equipment trust certificates. Under this legislation, the 
airlines can issue certificates with a flat guarantee that 
the holders can repossess the planes, which they h~ve not 
been able to do before. 
Not all the problems of the jet · air transports 
are connected with financing. Two of the major problems 
include enlarging airports and traffic control. 
To prevent airtraffic jams and crackups in a 
sky filled with high speed jets and the s~ower piston 
planes, the Civil Aeronautics Adminis.tration is going 
ahead with plans for ·modernizing traffic control. They are 
spending #246,000,000 on the 80,000 mile Federal airways 
system, over a period of three years. Th.e. scheme calls for 
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a network of 73 long-range radar installations, each with 
a 130 mile radius, so that planes will be in constant contact 
with the ground every stage of their journey. The C.A.A. is 
using the most advanced equipment in this network. 
The C.A.A. is also spending over $250,000,000 for 
lengthening runways and other improvements at major airports 
to be used by the jets. This is a four year plan, authorized 
by Congress. 
11 Express high,.,ayst• are being planned to keep the 
fast flying jets from being slowed down by other planes 
moving slower in air traffic. 
There have been articles in the Wall Street Journal 
within the past year, based upon reports of tb,e. Civil Aero-
nautics Administration., dealing w1 th the above topics. It 
will suffice to say here that the C.A.A. administrators 
feel that they will be ready for the jets when the .airlines 
are ready to fly them. 
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CHAPTER III 
OTHER FACTORS 
Passenger Traffic 
Today, the most important · source of' revenues is 
from passenger traffic. This has not always been so. In the 
early days of commercial flying, mail and subsidy payments 
constituted the bulk of revenues. Now, they are a very small 
percentage of income. Table # 2 shows very graphically the 
importance of passenger revenues. They have increased from 
19.7 percent in 1932 to 90 percent of gros£ revenue in 1955. 
Tabl.e # 2 
REVENUES - PERCENTAGE .OF TOTAL 
Passenger Mail Freight 
1932 19.7 80.0 0.3 
1936 56.0 38.1 2.5 
1940 66.1 29.5 2.7 
1945 74.5 18.5 5-5 
1950 82.0 9-5 6.3 
1955 90.0 3.0 5.0 
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Adapted from C.A.A. Statisti.cs. Fiscal years endlng June 30, 1955. 
Changes in passenger traffic are the result of 
several factors, such as at~1tudes, habits, safety, population, 
the National Economy, and changes in income and spending. 
Attitude can play an important . part in the success 
of any venture, pleasure or business. The public's attitude 
and acceptance of a product, service, or ideas can mean 
success or failure. 
Even in the transportation field, we have an example 
from the automobile industry, namely Chrysler. In the early 
1950's, Chrysler was producing what the trade felt was a 
good product as far as quality was concerned. But the design 
was not acceptable to the public, and Chrysler lost much of 
its share of the market. 
This idea of public acceptance affects .· the air-
lines also. People were reluctant at first to travel by air. 
It was new, and,like any new idea, was not really acceptable. 
However,more and more people began to use the airplane as 
a means of transportation, and it is now a very acceptable 
means of travel. People, at first, were afraid it was unsafe, 
but a sa tis factory safety record has convinc.ed most people 
that the plane is just as safe as a train. Businessmen found 
that they could save valuable time by flying. In times of 
emergencies, people have more or less been forced to fly, 
and found the experience satisfactory. The wide use of 
planes in World War II added to the change of attitude and. 
acceptance of air travel. 
With this growing acceptance, there has come about 
a change in our living habita. We live today at a much faster 
pace than our forefathers. Speed is much more important to-
day than it was twenty-five years ago. Now, that ~ir travel 
is accepted, the question is speed, and how fast we can get 
somewhere. The advent of jets is coincident with our changing 
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habits and faster pace of living. A man with two weeks 
vacation can fly just about anywhere and have almost all 
of the two weeks there. With jets, long holiday weekends 
on the opposite coast will soon be a reality. 
There can be no doubt that this change in public 
attitude and the growing acceptance of air travel will 
benefit the airlines. 
After the public acceptance, increases in popul-
ation and the Gross National Product will be ·added factors 
in the growth of air travel. 
With an increase in population, there is more 
need for food, clothing, housing, and servfces, including 
air transportation. The increase since 1929 is · over 43 
million, an increase of almost two million per year· on the 
.. 
average. Table # 3 shows the population figures for the 
United States for selected years and gives estimates for 
1960, 1965, and 1970. These estimates are 179.4 million, 
193.3 million, and 209.4, million, and are. considered by 
most economists and forecasters to be reasonable, possibly 
on the conservative side. Moreover, this population growth 
is concentrated in the major metropolitan areas that supply 
90 percent of the airline traffiQ. If this trend continues, 
it is obvious that the number of passengers carried and 
passenger miles flown will show outs.tanding and continued 
increases. 
Another question arises, and that is with regard 
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to the effect of the economy on the airlines. Will profit 
or loss follow the cycles of prosperity · and recess·ion? 
Gross. National Product figures are also given 
in Table# 3, both in current · prices and . terms of 1955 
dollars. In terms of 1955 dollars, G.N.P. increased from 
181.9 billion to 387.2 billion. Estimates are given for 
1960 of 460 billion, 550 billion by 1965, and 650 billion 
by 1970. These forecasts are based on an average annual 
increase of 3·5 percent andassume that there will be no 
wars or major depressions. 
During the recessions of 1949 and -1953, how were 
the airlines affected? Table # 6 shows no decline in either 
revenue passengers or revenue passenger miles flown during 
these periods. A look at the net income and earnings of each 
individual airline# shows a mixed trend for 1949-1950. 
American, Easternt and United all showed increased net in-
come and earnings. The smaller airlines were mixed, some 
showing increases, some decreases ·. However, in . the recession 
of 1953, American, Eastern, and United showed small declines. 
The trend of the smaller lines was again mixed. Two things 
must be remembered in trying to evaluate these figures. The 
first is that this industry is · a growing industry and would 
not necessarily follow the economic .trend. Secondly, there 
are individual company problems that would affect the net 
income and earnings figures. 
It does seem to follow, however, that should Gross 
National Pr~gt continue rising, the revenues anct earnings 
of the airlines should rise also. 
#These are included with company analysis in Chapter IV. 
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Table # 3 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, NATIONAL INCOME, AND POPULATION 
1929-1970 
Gross National Product National 
Year Population Current 1955 Income (Millions) Prices Prices Current (Billions .of Dollars) Prices 
1929 121.9 104.4 181.9 87.8 
1933 125.7 56.0 126.5 40.2 
1939 131.0 91.1 190.4 72.8 
1945 139·9 213.6 317.5 181.2 
1950 151.7 286.1 321.8 240.0 
1955 165.2 387.2 387.2 
1960* 179.4 460.0 
1965* 193·3 sso.o 
1970* 209.4 650.0 
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Source: Civil Aviation and Federal Airways Forecast December,l956 
* Estimated 
Closely conn.ected with Gross National. Product is 
a change in income and spending habits of the American 
people. Personal income has been rising steadily since the 
depression of 1932. Between 1939 and 1955, real per capita 
disposable income has increased about 60 percent. This in-
crease allows people to spend more on the luxuries of life, 
or at least the non-essentials. While a person does spend 
more on food and clothing when his income rises, the per-
centage does not rise. Over a certain basic level, there is 
very little extra expenditure for food and clothing, and the 
extra money is spent for better housing or more services, 
including transportation. Table # 4 gives figures on the 
amount and percentage of disposable income that is spent on 
transportation. 
Table # 4 
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION .EXPENDITURES (BILLIONS OF $) 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
Source: 
Total 
$146.6 
165.0 
177.6 
180.6 
194.0 
208.3 
218.3 
23Q.6 
236.5 
252.4 
All Trans-
portation 
$12.0 
15.3 
17.5 
20.0 
23.2 
22.8 
23.2 
27.1 
27.0 
32.0 
Percent Transport-
ation of Total 
8.19 
9.27 
9.85 
11.07 
11.96 
10.95 
10.63 
11.75 
11.41 
12.68 
C.A.A. report: Civil Aviation and Federal Airways Forecasts, 
December, 1956. 
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What these figures do not show is the growth of 
air travel separately. Consumer spending for air travel has 
grown at a considerably more rapid pace, with 1956 expenditures 
four times greater than in 1946. In fact, according to the 
Department of Commerce figures, consumption expenditures 
for airline travel have increased more rapidly during the 
post war period than · for any other ma·jor product or service. 
The airlines should benefit not only from the pro·jected rise 
in incomes, but should receive an increasingly larger share 
of each dollar spent. The question arises; will this reach 
a saturation point and level off, or will there always be 
some element of increase in population or increase in income 
to sustain some sort of rise. 
Table # 5 shows figures for travel by air, rail, 
bus, and private car. It will be seen that the number of 
passenger miles travelled by air increased threefold from 
1949 to 1955. Total rail travel, excluding commuting, de-
creased by 20 percent. Bus travel remained about the same. 
Of particular interest are the figures at the bottom of the 
table, showing the percentage increase of air travel to 
total which has almost doubled over this seven year period. 
Even more spectacular ·is the percentage. increase of air 
travel to total common carrier which has jus.t about tripled. 
Further figures for 1956 show that air travel was about 
equal to rail travel, rail travel having 23,636 million 
passenger miles and the airlines 23,255 million. Bus travel 
remained at about its 1955 level. It is predicted that by 
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1970, two thirds of the total common carrier traffic will 
. 
be by air travel. 
Based upon attitudes, increas.ed· population, and 
increased Gross National Product, a forecast was prepared 
by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Program Planning 
Office, "hich predicts · 66 million· pas.sengers and 35 billion 
revenue passenger . miles by 1960. This predic·tion is 93 
million revenue passengers and 49 billion revenue passenger 
miles by 1965, and by 1970, 118 million pas·se:ngers and 
60 billion passenger miles. (Se.e Table # 6). 
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Table # 5 
Domestic Intercity Passenger-M~iles Bw Mode of Travel and Class of Service 
1949-1955 (In Millions) 
Mode and Class 
Scheduled Air Carrier (1) 
Regular Service 
Coach Service 
Class I Line-Haul Railways {2) 
First Class Service 
Coach Service 
Motor Carriers-Class I,II,III (3) 
Total Common Carrier 
Private Automobile (5) 
Grand Total 
1949 
5,705 
5,454 
251 
29,522 
9,345 
20,273 
22,411 
58,738 
371,180 
429,918 
1950 
7,954 
5,898 
1,055 
25,781 
9,338 
17,443 
21,254 
55,989 
394,702 
450,691 
Percent Air to Total 1.8 1.8 
Percent Air to Total Common Carrier 11 .• 4 14,2 
1951 
10,500 
9,225 
1,274 
29,750 
10,225 
19,524 
22,299 
52,549 
444,551 
507,110 
1952 
12,461 
10,105 
2,355 
29,252 
9,504 
19,758 
-- -
21,233 
52,945 
475,945 
538,892 
2.1 2~3 
16.8 19 ·.8 
{1) Scheduled operations of domestic trunk line and local 
(2) Includes Pullman Company and exclu_des co_mmutation 
(3) Excludes local, suburban, and charter service 
service carriers 
(4) Estimated on basis of decrease forecasted by ATA 
(5) Estimated Intercity passenger-miles, revised series 
(6) ATA Estimate 
Source: CAA Statistical Handbook of Civil Aviation - 1956 
1953 
14,688 
10,952 } 
3,725 
26,905 
7,950 
18,955 
19,634 
51,227 
529,194 
590,421 
2.5 
24,0 
1954 
·15,696 
11,375 
5,321 
24,537 
5,850 
17,687 
15,934 
58,167 
548,753 
606,930 
2~8 
28.7 
1955 
19,741 
13,025 
.6 '· 7lq 
23 ;755 -
5,441 
17,314 
15,426 (4) 
59,910 
575,000 (5) 
634,910 
3~1 
33.0 
Table # 6 
DOMESTIC AIRLINE PASSENGER .TRAFFIC 1946-1970 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 (Prel.) 
1960 (Est.) 
Low 
Inter. 
High 
1965 (Est.) 
Low 
Inter. 
High 
1970 (Est.) 
Low 
Inter. 
High 
Source: 
Revenue Passen~ers 
· (In Millions} 
12.2 
12.9 
13.2 
15.1 
17.3 
22.7 
25.0 
28.7 
32-3 
38.0 
41.9 
60.0 
66.0 
72.0 
80.0 
93.0 
106.0 
100.0 
118.0 
136.0 
Revenue Passenger Miles 
(In Billions) 
5.9 
6.1 
6.0 
6.8 
8.0 
10.6 
12.5 
14.8 
16.8 
19.8 
22.4 
32.0 
35.0 
38.0 
42.0 
49.0 
56.0 
52.0 
60.0 
68.0 
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1946-1955 data from Office of Carrier Accounts and Statistics,CAB 
1960,1965, and 1970 estimated by CAA Program Planning Office. 
Competition 
Competition as it affects the airlines is of two 
sorts• There is a sort of internal competition, within the 
industry, where the airlines compete with one another for 
each dollar spent on air travel. Such competition would arise 
where there is more than one line servicing the same area. 
The other type is external competition where airlines compete 
with other industries for each dollar of dispos~ble ~ncome. 
By offering certain inducements at times of off-peak loads, 
they hope to catch passengers who would not be flying and 
thus increase their load-factors. This could be compared to 
reduced rates for Sunday and evening long distance telephone 
calls. Competition of both types is quite strong, and at 
times, the attraction offered covers both types of competition. 
Routes are certified by the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
An airline cannot give service to any city it desires, but 
only to those it is certified to serve. In the early days 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Board acted to restrict 
competition. The idea behind it being that if an airline 
was given the only certificate to fl.i a certain route, that 
airline·, by means of the monopoly, would become- strong. 
Later, when that airline was strong and self-supporting 
in that particular region, the Civil Aeronautics Board would 
certify another airline to cover almost the same route. 
There might be some minor differences, such as certain 
in-between cities that would be different or certified to 
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only one line. If there was sufficient demand, and after two 
airlines were self-supporting on a stated route, a third 
line or even more might be certified by the Board. The most 
recent example is the granting of a route to Northeast Air-
lines for the New York-Miami run, where two others already 
were certified. 
Where there is more than one certified airline, 
competition has been fierce, and airlines have tried several 
ways of enticing passengers. To help develop the great potential 
of possible air travelers, most airlines have instituted air 
coach service. By flying air coach, the passenger gives up 
certain luxuries of first class travel in return for flying 
at a reduced fare. This idea compares to travel by coach 
versus a ~llman on a railroad. The idea has caught on quite 
rapidly, and has increased the number of passengers now going 
by air. Air coach service dates back to about 1948. First 
class fares run about six cents per mile. In contrast, coach 
fares are now running as low as 3.2 cents per mile on some 
routes. A coach passenger travels in a more crowded plane, 
has no free meals, and frequently has to travel at off-peak 
hours. The fares are now low enough to make them competitive 
with rail travel, on transcontinental travel. This is an 
example of both types of competition. 
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Table # 7 
PERCENTAGE OF DOMESTIC AIR COACH TO INDUSTRY TOTAL 
Passenger Revenue Passenger 
Year Miles Passengers Revenues 
1949 3.8 % 2.4% 2.9 % 
1950 13.4 7·7 10.1 
1951 12.4 7'14 9.9 
1952 18.8 10.9 14.5 
1953 26.0 14.2 19.6 
1954 32.8 18.2 
1955 35.0 
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board 
As can be seen by Table # 7, there has been a 
rapid growth of air coach travel since . it was started. In 
the next few years, it is expected to constitute about fifty 
percent of the passenger miles flown. While drawing passengers 
from the great pool of travelers who do not now fly, air 
coach service is also cutting into the first class travel 
accommodations. Air coach travel is said to be more subject 
to seasonal influences and more sensitive to economic changes.* 
The opposite of air c·oach is the "ultra plush" 
service offered by a coupl·e of airlines - United and American. 
These flights are aimed to ea tch the '. more exclusive passengers, 
offer certain "extras" at a premium price, slightly above 
first class fares. 
* 5, P• A34 
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Another innovation was started by Trans-World 
Airways a couple of years ago, when it started offering 
11 twin service" flights. These are flights that offer first 
class service in one section of the plane, and air coach in 
another. This · type service should increase the load fac.tor. 
Other airlines have been slow to accept this idea, only a 
couple of lines offering ~t. Some lines feel that it will 
divert first class travelers to coach if they find that the 
particular flight they want to go on has both accommodations. 
However, according to information contained in the annual 
reports of the companies that have tried it, they seem quite 
satisfied with the plan. 
T.W.A. now offers another innovation,- sleeping 
seats. The seats recline at a 55° angle and have foot rests. 
They are availabl.e to first class passengers on its "Jet 
Stream" flights. 
Airlines now offer special family fares and special 
round trip fares as a means of encouraging air travel. On 
certain off-peak flights on certain mid-week days when air 
travel is lower, members of a family can fly half-price when 
one full fare is paid. On the round trip arrangements, price 
reductions are available if passage is made on the off-peak 
days, these round trip plana being good for thirty days. 
There are also plans whereby a person can purchase 
a vacation package plan. This combines the airline fares with 
hotel accommodations. 
- · 
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The airlines are going to all kinds of expense to 
woo passengers, because the competition has been so fierce. 
Subsidies 
Subsidy payments have been a stabilizing influence 
in the finances of airlines since they were established by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board around 1938. The fact that the govern-
ment would practically guarantee a fair return to investors 
has been a source of safety for those putting money into air-
line stocks. 
Subsidies have always been tied to the flying of 
mail. At first, there was practically no distinction between 
what was paid for carrying mail by air, and what was paid as 
a subsidy. Any deficit that the airline had was automatically 
.'covered. ln October 1951, however, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board announced the results of an investigation it had held 
and stated tha~ from then on, there would be a division of 
the two. There would be certain prices paid for the flying 
of mail plus any subsidy that was necessary to maintain the 
fair return. The prices per ton mile for transporting the 
mail have varied and are set by much the same procedure as 
the establishment of passenger and freight rates. They are 
set to give generally a seven to eight percent return on the 
invested capital. 
In the early stages of commercial flying, all 
airlines were receiving subsidies. Gradually, several of them 
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came off. Certain lucrative routes were instrumental in 
putting the airlines in the black. The Miami-New York route, 
for example, is credited with taking Eastern Airlines and 
National Airlines off the subsidy list. 
At the end of 1955, there were only three airlines 
sti.ll on subsidy. They were Northeast Airlines, Continental 
Airlines, and Colonial Airlines. Continental Airlines came 
off the subsidy list in 1956. Colonial Airlines became 
merged with Eastern, thus leaving Northeast as the sole 
domestic trunkline still receiving government aid. 
Recently, during the latter part of 1955, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board awarded the third noute on the 
Miami-New York run to Northeast Airlines. This lucrative 
route, as it has done before,ie expected to take Northeast 
out of t he red, and put it on a firm financial footing. 
It was only a few mc>nths after the first flight was com-
pleted by Northeast, which was January 6, 1957, that the 
airline went off subsidy. The C.AB started the ''show cause'' 
proceedings to stop the subsidy within months of the award. 
Thus, for the first time since the start of commercial 
flying, there will be no government help for domestic air-
lines. 
The revenues from flying the mail will still be 
coming in to the airlines. However, this total payment to 
all domestic airlines amounted to only 29.7 million dollars, 
and was only 2.6 percent of the total domestic airline 
revenue. 
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Even though an airline has been de-subsidized, 
it can apply for subsidy and get back on the subsidy list 
if its profits take a dip· and it otherwise qualifies. Present 
law practically requires the CAB to come to ·the aid of any 
scheduled airline that flies in the "red" for any prolonged 
time. There has been legislation proposed and supported by 
the Civil Aeronautics Board to the effect that, one an air-
line was off subsidy andhad proved itself capable of self-
sufficiency, it would be barred from returning to government 
subsidization. How far this proposal will get, no one knows. 
Recently, one of the larger airlines, Capital, 
filed a request with the CAB to get back on the subsidy. 
list. Capital had suffered over a year of ~eclining profits 
and had even reduced some of its orders for jet planes. How-
ever, the recent increase in fares caused Capital to withdraw 
its. application. 
Congress has taken an interest in subsidies from 
two ·point.s of view. First, it is changing legislat-ure, so 
that the airlines no longer will have to deduct capital gains 
from the sale of aircraft from their subsidy. This would allow 
them to apply such capital gains directly to the purchase of 
new aircraft. Secondly, some members of Congress feel that 
the airlines, being regulated as they are and subject to 
subsidies, should not be .involved in other businesses, such 
as television. Some feel that when a line "intermingles 11 one 
or more bus inesses with air transportation, they should not 
be eligible for subsidies. 
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In an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal, 
the Cll reviewed the jet situation and, with regard to sub-
sidies, felt that jete would be self-supporting , and of them -
selves cause no need for further subsidization. 
The CAB has worked long and hard at getting the 
airlines · off the subsidy l~st. It will work· equally hard to 
keep them off, even to the point of increasing fares and 
adding new routes. 
Fares 
Airline fares is one subject on which there is no 
agreement. The a~rlines continually seek higher fares, 
especially in times of rising costs. The Civil Aeronautics 
Board, though it .tries to set adequate rates, is reluctant 
to raise those rates. Passengers, of course, would like to 
see the fares lowered. 
The major problem in setting the rates is to set 
them at a level that will give the companies a fair return 
on their investment. There is no agreement on what constitutes 
a fair return. Some companies have earned a return on the~r 
investment as high as eleven percent. Many feel that such a 
return is too high, and that a more equitable ret-qrn should · 
be closer to six or eight percent. 
The Civil Aerone.utics Board has been conducting, 
for over a year, a study of airline fares, based on a fair 
return on investment. The .study is expected to last several 
additional months. 
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In the meantime, airline profits have been going 
down. While the airlines have been carrying more people, and 
gross revenues have been up, the increase in costs has been 
even greater. Capital Airlines . even went so far as to file a 
request for subsidization. The CAB has now recognized the 
plight of the airlines and, in January, granted a temporary 
increase of four percent on all fares, plus a $ 1.00 charge 
on all tickets. This amounts to an average of 6.6 percent 
fare boost. This came as a result of a three to two vote 
by the CAB and was effective on February 10, 1958, after 
proper application by the airlines. All domestic lines made 
rapid application and have put the increase into effect. 
It is expected to brighten the earnings picture of most air-
lines considerably. This increase will continue until the 
CAB files its findings on completion of its current study. 
This fare increase was due, no doubt, to poor operating re-
sults in the last half of 1957, as similar requests for in-
creased rates were turned down by the CAB as recently as 
1957 - in August. 
Now that the CAB has granted this increase, chances 
are good that the airlines will not have fares cut back when 
the findings are released, unless they should suddenly show 
large profits. 
Load Factor and Average Length of Haul: 
Certain ra~ios or figures, while not important by 
themselves, help to give a clearer picture of the profitable 
or unprofitable operations of the airline .• 
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The load factor is such a figure. It is the per-
centage of available seat miles flown .in scheduled service 
that is actually sold. Table # 8 shows the load factor for 
the twelve domestic airlines rrom 1947 through 1956. 
Table # 9 shows · the break-even load factor for the airlines, 
1953 through 1956. 
Another figure that is important . is the Average 
Length of Passenger Hauls expressed in miles. Because the 
longer hauls are more profitable, it is obvious that the 
longer the average haul, the better off the airline is. 
Table # 10 shows these figures. 
American 
1952 72 ~9 
1953 67.7 
1954 68 .• 1 
1955 68~0 
1956 68.5 
1953 59 
1954 60 
1955 57 
1956 58 
Braniff 
61~2 
56~2 
62.1 
61~6 
60.9 
58 
57 
56 
55 
Capital 
57 '.6 
58.8 
58~7 
59.0 
60.2 
54 
55 
56 
60 
Table # 8 
Revenue Passenger Load Factor 
Conti- North-
nental Delta Eastern National east 
55.0 64~8 58.3 63~2 58 .• 0 
51 .4 61.5 60.2 66.7 55 .• 3 
54.3 60.1 58~5 59~6 55.9 
53.6 63.9 61.0 64~1 59 ~2 -
54.3 60.2 60.7 65~9 58.5 
Table # 9 
Breakeven Passenger Load Factor 
55 
52 
53 
58 
57 
56 
52 
53 
52 
53 
55 
56 
54 
70 
69 
69 
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board 
North-
west 
65.3 
59~7 
60.3 
59.7 
61.2 
63 
57 
53 
56 
T'· :A 
75.0 
70.8 
68.1 
64~6 
64.4 
64 
62 
59 
62 
United 
72~3 
68.3 
65.9 
67.1 
66 .• 9 
57 
58 
59 
60 
estern 
65~9 
58.6 
55.7 
59.1 
61.9 
53 
51 
51 
54 
Table ft. 10 
Average Length of Passenger Haul {Miles} -
Conti- North- North-
American Braniff Capital nental Delta Eastern National east west TWA United esterr; 
1945 587 431 251 388 376 498 470 212 630 886 745 405 
1946 526 397 278 349 412 518 591 191 604 841 619 400 
1947 500 340 263 370 404 510 511 201 539 767 620 404 
1948 469 342 270 363 377 483 546 191 530 685 598 389 
1949 468 333 295 363 398 452 567 191 576 670 583 383 
1950 500 337 300 351 439 466 621 189 640 705 573 378 
1951 509 346 312 373 456 450 647 192 661 730 614 371 
1952 561 344 314 388 455 485 664 196 675 785 665 386 
1953 559 378 313 400 434 498 711 197 706 808 660 429 
1954 580 367 312 401 441 505 707 199 674 778 667 482 
1955 590 371 311 369 455 610 707 200 661 756 686 471 
1956 623 403 342 367 476 511 699 202 661 787 691 494 
Source: Civil Aeronautics Board 
CHAPTER IV 
INDIVIDUAL COMPANY REVIEW 
In this chapter, a brief summary of each of the 
twelve domestic airlines is presented, with emphasis on 
the territory covered, financial situation, and a review 
of some statistics. 
In reviewing an individual company, management 
and company policy play important par.ts in evaluating that 
company. Being unable to know managementpersonally, the 
Forbes Management Survey has been substituted, and will be 
presented in the last chapter, under conclusions. 
If the airline is not covering the whole country, 
then territory serviced is important. If the area is .one 
wi tb growing indus.tries and increasing population, the 
growth prospects of the line are good. If . the section is 
not growing, what are the growth possibilities of that 
airline? Does the airline service mostly vacationists or 
tourists, or, like Capital, is it confined to steel and 
industrial cities? These questions must be answered in 
analyzing a particular airline stock. 
The financial position of a company is obviously 
important, and in the following reviews, attention is paid 
to financial arrangements that have been made, particularly 
those concerning jets. 
The following reviews are not meant to be com-
prehens·ive, ·· but to present some facts and statistics in 
connection with the coming "jet age". 
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American Airlines, Inc. 
Amertcan Airlines is the largest of the domestic 
airlines, and operates without subsidies. Basically, American 
Airlines operates transcontinental routes from the larger 
eastern cities, such .as Boston, New York, and Washington 
to the larger western cities, such as San Francisco and Los 
Angeles. It also supplies service to Chicago and the midwest 
as well as Texas and the southwest. Most of its routes are 
in an east-west direction·. These large coastal cities give 
American an advantage in that they generate mostly long 
haul traffic. In 1957, American was authorized to fly the 
popular Chicago-Mexico City route. 
American Airlines operates a fleet of about 200 
planes. Currently, most of these planes are of DC-7 or 
Convair 240 models. With an eye to the jet age, American 
has on order 35 Lockheed Electra turbo props and 30 Boeing 
707 jets. Twenty-five Electras ar.e scheduled for delivery 
before the end of 1959. The Boeing planes are scheduled for 
delivery from late in 1958 through 1960. American feels that 
the Boeing plane, to be used on long flights, will be the 
best for speed, altitude, and operating economy. The Lock-
heed Electra will be used on short and medium length fl'tghts, 
and between the two, American feels it will have a well 
balanced fleet. 
American Airlines caters to all types of traffic. 
It offer_6._ first class service, under the name "Mercury" 
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which it claims is the finest airline service - service 
with prestige. It also offers an improved air coach service 
under the ·name "Royal . Coachman''. In an attempt to compete 
\\ I' for the p2ush air service between New York and Chicago, 
American has started a new super-luxury flight, designated 
as "The Captain's Flagship", and charges three dollars extra 
for the flights. Amer1c~ operates about 70 % first class 
service and about 30 % air coach. 
American Airlines has authorized capital expendit-
ures, most of which have been committed, totaling #290,000,000. 
This is mostly for aircraft, with some buildings, and other 
equipment included. Over $100,000,000 was expended by the 
end of 1957. Arrangements were concluded with insurance 
companies, primarily with the Metropolitan Life InsuranceCo., 
to borrow $135,000,000. This borrowing is in two note series, 
one for $75,000,000 at an interest rate of 4 percent. The 
other is for the balance of $60,000,000 at 4i percent in-
terest. Repayments are to be made over a thirty year period 
with the first payment due in 1967. American has also helped 
finance its jets by selling old planes. 
Like most airlines, American had increased revenues 
in 1957. Expenses·, however, increased more, resulting in a 
I 
lower profit. It flew 5.1 billion passenger miles in 1957, 
a 5 % increase over 1956. 
In 1957, American paid a dividend of one dollar. 
it sold between 24 1/8 and 14. It is currently selling 
for 17 5/8. 
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Table # 11 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Revenue miles 
(000 ,000) . 89.4 103.7 99-7 121.7 133.4 143.1 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 5.1 5.8 5·9 7·3 7.8 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 2,927.4 3,306.4 3,456.7 4,360.3 4,899.6 5,142.6 
Load Factor 72.5 67.7 67.8 68.0 68.4 
so · 
Table II 12 
American Airlines, Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yre.) 
Millions I a 0 m m on $ p e r a h a r e 
1948 89.3 d2.89 d0.67 Nil. 10 - 6 1/8 
1949 103.2 7.14 0.89 Nil. 10 3/8 - 6 3/4 
1950 118.7 10.40 1.39 0.25 14 - 9 5/8 
1951 163.0 10.55 1.42 0.50 17 1/8 - 13 1/2 
1952 187.3 12.51 1.72 o.so 16 3/4 - 12 1/4 
1953 208.3 13.41 1.86 0.50 15 3/8 - 11 3/8 
1954 214.8 11.43 1.51 0.60 22 5/8 - 11 1/2 
1955 260.8 18.61 2.32 o.8o 29 1/8 - 20 1/2 
1956 291.5 19.57 2.40 1.00 26 1/4 - 22 
1957 305.9 10.99 1.31 1.00 24 1/8 - 14 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
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Braniff Airways, Inc. 
Braniff Airways, Inc. is one of the medium sized, 
sectional., domestic airlines with routes centered in the 
midwest. It covers the section from Chicago and the Twin 
Cities (St . Paul and Minneapolis) to Texas. Many of its 
routes cons ti tue short-haul flights;. It also, as a result 
of a 1955 Civil Aeronautics Bo·ard ruling, has a long haul 
flight from Fort Worth and Dallas to the New York-Newark 
area. This award has been helpful in adding to Braniff's 
financial position. Braniff also has -a few direct flights 
to Central and South America. 
Braniff, in may of its flights, uses a combination 
type plane that provides both first class service as well as 
air coach. These planes are especially equipped DC-7's. It 
operates 11 El Dorad.o" service with forty-eight first class 
seats and fourteen air coach, and also the "El Conquistador" 
flights with twelve first class and fifty air coach seats. 
The purpose of such combination service is to cut costs and 
increase load factors. This type service has been popular, 
and Braniff feels certain it will produce the desired re-
sults. 
In 1956, Braniff did not follow the:. trend of the 
other airlines, but instead showed an ~ncrease in operating 
profits. Operating revenues increased 12.66% while operating 
expenses increased only 11.53 %. Passenger load factor was 
up from 58.55 % to 59.45 %. Figures for 1957 are not available 
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at this time, but for the nine months ending September 30, 
1957, the airline showed a rise in revenue of 19.7% to a 
new high. At the same time, expenses rose 22 % with a re-
sulting 10 % drop in ,profits. 
Braniff has nine Lockheed Electras on order for 
delivery beginning in May 1959. Delivery should be completed 
about _June 1960. It also has on order five Boeing 707 jet 
liners, with delivery scheduled from October 1959 to .March 
1960. 
Braniff, in November 1956, entered into an agree-
ment with seven life insurance companies for sale on or 
before April 1961 of .$35,000,000 worth of 4 3/4% Equipment 
Mortgage Sinking Fund Bonds. There is an additional five 
million worth of bonds optional. These bonds are due July 
1976. Certain redemption requirements are made, including 
a sinking fund. Certain restrictions are placed on the 
capitAl of the company. All aircraft, engines, flight 
equipment, and spare parts are pledged as security. 
Last year (1957), Braniff paid a dividend of 
.60, as it has since 1955. The price range was lli to 6t 
and is currently selling for 91. 
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Table # 13 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 20.5 27.3 26.7 29.3 32.3 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 426.0 556.4 . 617.5 679.9 787.0 
Load Factor · 56.85 ·53,75 59.56 58.55 59.45 
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Table # 14 
Braniff Airways, Inc, 
Total 
Oper. .Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Diva. (Calendar Yra.) 
Millions I C o m m o n I p e r s h a r e 
1948 14.63 0.19 0.19 Nil. 10 1/4 - 6 1/8 
1949 18.44 0.22 0.22 Nil. 8 5/8 - 6 1/8 
1950 21.37 1.23 1.23 0.25 13 3/8 - 7 3/4 
1951 25.22 1.27 1.27 0.50 16 -12 
1952 33.19 1.30 1.02 Nil 14 3/4 - 9 1/8 
1953 39.47 0.01 0.01 Nil 11 1/8 - 5 7/8 
1954 45.94 3.71 2.81 0.50 17 - 6 1/8 
1955 46.80 1.67 0.91 o.6o 18 7/8 -12 1/4 
1956 52.72 1.89 0.64 0.60 14 7/8 -10 
1957 62.89 1.73 0.59 0.60 11 1/2 - 6 1/2 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's .Indus try Survey 
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Capital Airlines, Inc. 
Capital Airlines, one of the medium-sized inter-
sectional airlines, is based in Washington, D.C., and operates 
mainly east of the Mississippi River. It services such 
centers as New York, Chicago, the Twin Cities, Washington, 
and Nor th Carolina. It competes with the five largest air-
lines in the area of its services. It has a long haul route 
from New York to New Orleans with intermediary stops. The 
management of Capital Airlines feels it needs long haul 
routes to be financially sound. Capital has been trying to 
get a Chicago to Florida and a New York to San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, route, which it considers would be lucrative and help 
Capital's weakened financial position. Many of Capital's 
routes cover steel manufacturing and processing centers, so 
that a strike or a period of poor business has a serious 
effect on .Capital's earnings. The short routes, of the type 
flown by Capital, are affected more than long flights after 
a serious airplane crash or when public confidence is shaken. 
People will use other means of transportation rather than 
fly for short trips. Capital's earnings have been affected 
by its route situation in the past and will be until it 
gets some larger routes. 
Capital was the first airline to use turbo prop 
jet aircraft. Capital has been purchasing Viscount planes 
through sale of equipment purchase notes to the British. 
The line is now well converted to the Viscount, having about 
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sixty of this type aircraft. Capital's management claims 
that the slash in its deficit for 1957 was due to the intro-
duction of the Viscounts. 
Capital, in December 1957, asked the government 
to resume subsidy payments to offset what it considered 
its "critical financial condition". Capital claimed it needed 
a $ 12,000,000 subsidy. It flew under subsidy until October 
1951. With the recent announcement of fare increase by the 
CAB, Capital withdrew its request for subsidy. 
Capital had also made arrangements to postpone some 
of its payments to the British on the Viscount planes, because 
of its ."critical financial condition". These payments were 
running close to a million doll~rs monthly. 
Capital, at first, deferred purchase of 14 
DeHaviland Comets, a pure jet plane, and 15 Viscounts, and 
later cancelled the order bec·ause of its financial position. 
After the CAB announced its fare increase, Capital 
Airlines announced it was ordering 15 jet airliners from 
Convair, costing about 60 millifJn dollars. There is a definite 
order for 9 o~ · the Convair 80S's, with an option on the other 
six. Included in the negotiations was an agreement for 
General Dynamics, owner of Convair, to refinance $48,500,000 
that Capital still owes on its current fleet of Viscount 
planes. 
In July 1956, the company borrowed $12,000,000 
through the issuance of 4t % Convertible Subordinated 
Debentures ue in July 1976. Beginning in 1966, Capital is 
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required to provide for the annual retirement of $600,000 
principal amount of the Debentures. These debentures are 
subordinated to all other notes, and restrictions are placed 
on dividends. 
During 1957, the stock sold in a range of 26 3/8 
to 9 7/8 and is currently selling at 17i· There was no 
dividend paid in 1957. 
Table # 15 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 26.30 28.80 29.49 31.21 39·79 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
{000,000) 2.01 2.25 2.42 2.57 2.98 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown (000,000) 637.6 716.6 765.2 803.9 1,021.6 
Load Factor 57-59 58.99 50.69 50.94 60.17 
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Table # 16 
Capital Airlines, Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Diva. {Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions $ C o m m o n I p e r s h a r e 
1948 23.19 d0.13 d0.26 Nil. 8 3/8 - 3 7/8 
1949 26.72 1.68 3.51 Nil. 9 3/8 - 5 1/4 
1950 29.82 1.16 2.20 Nil. 14 5/8 - 8 1/2 
1951 38.70 1.77 2.26 Nil. 17 1/4 -12 
1952 40.40 1.41 1.80 Nil. 16 3/4 - 9 7/8 
1953 45.58 1.65 2.10 Nil 13 1/2 - 8 1/2 
1954 48.14 1.75 2.10 Nil. 27 1/8 - 8 5/8 
1955 50.85 4.14 4.55 Nil. 42 1/4 -22 3/4 
1956 63.71 dl.26 dl.38 Nil. 41 1/2 -23 1/2 
1957 94.40 d2.87 Nil. 26 3/8 - 9 7/8 
§ource: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
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Continental Air Lines, Inc. 
Continental Air Lines, Inc. is one of the two 
small domestic airlines. It services the southwest states 
of Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and Oklahoma.:. Most of the 
routes are short hauls around thesestates. In a CAB decision 
made in November 1955, and upheld by the United States Court 
of Appeals, issued in January 1957, Continental was awarded 
.a Chicago - Los Angeles route. Service began on this route 
in April 1957. Continental is still seeking rou.tes from 
Texas to the West Coast. 
As a result of the award of the Chicago - Los 
Angeles route, Continental. was taken off the subsidy list, 
and now operates subsidy-free. 
Continental is changing its fleet from Douglas 
DC-3 1 s and Convair 340's to a fleet consisting· of Douglas 
DC-6's and DC-7's. It also has three Convair 440's. Small 
as it is, Continental has jet planes on order. In 1958, it 
expects delivery of 15 Vickers Viscount 810D prop jet planes. 
Continental also has ordered four Boeing 707 jets, for 
delivery in 1959. Continental currently operates a fleet 
of about 30 .planes. There are notes payable of over 
#4,000,000 secured by chattel mortgages on certain aircraft. 
These notes are payable in twenty-four quarterly payments 
beginning June 30, 1958. Limits are placed on dividends. 
There are outstanding 4 3/4 % ·convertible Sub-
ordinated Debentures due November 1, 1970. These debentures 
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may be redeemed at any one time -at prices ranging from 
103-t downward to 100 after October 31, 1968. The company 
is required to purchase $100,000 for retirement during each 
of the five years- beginning June 1, 1960. It must also 
create a sinking fund of a minimum of $330,000 annually 
for six years beginning November 1, 1964. Chase Manhattan 
Bank is the major lending source for -continental. There is 
a credit arrangement for #25,000,000, $ 11,000,000 of which 
will be r evolving in nature. through Sep tember 30, 1959. 
Most of this will be applied to the purchase of new aircraft. 
Continental paid a fifty cent dividend in 1957. 
It sold in the range of 12 1/8 to 5 1/4. Currently, it is 
selling at 6. 
Table # 17 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 7.94 8.19 8.13 12.30 13.44 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.60 0.71 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 139.0 148.9 167.5 222.3 259.6 
Load Factor 54.94 51.54 54.31 53.65 54.31 
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Table # 18 
Continental Air Lines • .Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions I C om m o n $ p e r s h a r e 
1948 4.82 0.15 0.48 Nil. 8 1/4 - 4 3/4 
1949 5.72 0.04 0.12 Nil. 6 7/8 - 4 7/8 
1950 6.22 0.19 0.62 0.25 . 7 7/8 - 5 1/4 
1951 8.12 0.38 1.24 0.50 10 1/2 - 7 3/4 ' 
1952 10.20 0.59 1.48 0.50 9 7/8 - 6 1/2 
1953 11.08 1.13 2.82 0.50 8 7/8 - 6 1/2 
1954 12.12 0.53 1.32 0.50 . 13 3/8 - 6 3/8 
1955 16.08 o.4o 0.83 0.50 15 5/8 -10 7/8 
1956 18.55 0.58 1.22 0.50 15 1/8 -10 1/4 
1957 23.27 0.10 0.13 0.50 12 1/8 - 5 1/4 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
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Delta Air Lines, Inc, 
.Delta Air Lines, Inc. is one of the larger domestic 
lines, ranking close to the big four. It is consid.ered a 
sectional airline, having started out as a trans-southern 
line. It has expanded and now has long haul routes that 
connect New York, Detroit, and Chicago. Much of its service 
is still. concentrated on local routes, flying from New 
Orleans to Caribbean ports. The area serviced by Delta is 
what is known by the management as 11 the growth area". 
Delta operates first-class service in DC-7 air-
liners under the name "Golden Crown". It operates day and 
night coach flights over most of its network under the 
designation of uFlying Scots". 
Delta1 s fleet consists of about 65 planes, most 
of them Douglas DC-3, Convair 340, and Douglas DC-7 types. 
Delta has 18 jets on order, 10 of the Convair 880 type, and 
8 of the Douglas DC-8 type. The Douglas DC-8's are scheduled 
for final delivery in October -1959. These planes are scheduled 
to be used for joint first class and air coach service. 
The Convair 880 will be used for intermediate flight distances 
and are due to be delivered in 1960. 
To help strengthen the financial structure, Delta 
sold 125,000 shares of common stock in July 1956, making a 
total of 1,121,944 shares as of the end of fiscal 1957. This 
would be a dilution of stockholders equity, unless each stock-
holder bought into the new issue in proportion to his previous 
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holdings. This sale of stock was slated for general ex-
pansion ot operations. Delta is the only line to have sold 
stock in the past few years, other lines turning to long-
term borrowing from banks or insurance companies. 
Delta's only outstanding debt is the result of a 
credit agreement with a group of 25 banks under whicp the 
borrowing of $30,000,000 is permitted on unsecured notes 
maturing December 30, 1960. As of that date, the aggregate 
outstanding balances due each bank will be consolidated 
into one note repayable to such bank in quarterly install-
ments beginning March 31, 1961. These notes bear interest 
at not less than 3t% nor more than 4% per annum. Delta's 
stock was admitted on the New York Stock Exchange on 
April 17, 1957, having been over the counter before that time. 
About 15 % of Delta's stock is owned by the 
R.J. Reynolds Company. 
Delta's fiscal year ends on June 30. Figures 
since the year's end are incomplete, but Delta seems to be 
flying more passengers and experiencing rising revenue and 
rising expenses. A decline in earnings for the year ending 
June 30, 1958 is anticipated. Earnings for the first six 
months were #.26 a share compound with # .71 the year before. 
The 1957-1958 high-low listed by Dow Jones is 
26 3/8 - 15 1/8. Delta is currently selling at 20. 
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Table # 19 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Revenue miles (000,000) 20.67 31.92 31-58 33.96 41.67 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried (000,000) 2.0 2.3 2.6 
Revenue 
·Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 952.4 1,080.3 1,299·5 
Load Factor 65.41 57.26 62.75 62.55 50.90 
Table # 20 
Delta Air Lines. Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Inc.ome Earns. Diva. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions $ C om m o n • p e r e h a r e 
1948 12.82 0.20 0.33 Nil. 15 5/8 - 10 3/8 
1949 15.23 0.64 1.02 Nil. 13 3/8 - 10 1/4 
1950 17.19 0.82 1.30 1.40 16 
-
9 1/4 
1951 22.22 1.63 2.61 0.40 21 5/8 - 16 1/4 
1952 27.02 1.65 2.64 1.00 24 1/4 - 19 1/4 
1953 48.26 5.08 5.54 o.8o 25 3/4 - 16 
1954 50.33 1.31 1.74 0.96 24 3/4 - 15 3/8 
1955 59.19 2.17 2.62 0.96 38 - 23 3/8 
1956 66.60 4.68 4.70 0.96 38 1/4 - 32 5/8 
1957 78.60 2.62 2.34 . 1.20 40 - 27 1/2 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
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Eastern Air Lines. Inc. 
Eastern Air Lines is the second ranking airline 
in the domestic field. In June 1956, Eastern bought Colonial 
Airlines, a small domestic line, which is expected to be a 
beneficial addition. Eastern is an. intersectional, well 
integrated line, covering the eastern third of the United 
States, east of the Mis·sissippi River. Most of its routes 
run basically in a north-south direction, and most ar e 
medium or long haul flights • . Eastern, at one time, had ex-
clusive rights to the lucrative Boston-New York-Miami route. 
In the last two years, the CAB has authorized National Air-
lines and Northeast Airlines to fly this route, giving 
Eastern considerable competition. Eastern also flies routes 
to Bermuda, San Juan, Mexico City, and more recently has been 
awarded a route to Panama. 
Eastern has been operating for 30 years, 23 of 
which have been profitable. It has operated the last 18 
years without subsidy. Its earnings record is the best in 
the industry. Eastern has flown over 50 million passengers 
since it started serviGe. 
Eastern operates a fleet of about 165 planes.· 
These include Lockheed Super G . Cons tell a tiona, DC-7' s, and.. 
Convair 440'a. Eastern's plans for the jet age include 
40 Lockheed Electras to be delivered in. 1958 and 1959. It 
also has on order 20 Douglas DC-8's for delivery in 1960-
1961. 
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The long term financing of these jets has been 
arranged without much dilution of the stockholders equity. 
Eastern has made arrangements to borrow #90,000,000 from 
the Equitable Life Assurance Society. They have already 
drawn down #50,000,000 of this amount. The remaining $4o,ooo,ooo 
may be borrowed at any time prior to December 16, 1959. The 
rest of the financing of new planes will come out of earnings 
or depreciation allowances. There are restrictions on dividends 
under the terms of the loan, but Eastern is in such a position 
that it can meet these requirements and pay a dividend. These 
restrictions are: 
a} current assets shall be at least 125 % 
of current liabilities 
b) net working capital shall be at least 
15 million dollars 
c) the sum of 5 million dollars plus net income 
for the period commencing January 1, 1955, 
shall be greater than the aggregate amount 
of all dividends declared during such period. 
Earnings dropped in ·1957, but Eastern paid its 
annual dividend of $ 1.00. It is expected that there may be 
some recovery in 1958. 
In the year 1957, the stock sold in the range 
51 3/4 - 27. The price earnings ratio was 11. The yield 
was 2.9. It is currently selling at 38 1/8. 
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Table # 21 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 69.2 76.9 88.5 97.4 111.2 
Revenue 
_Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 3.9 4.8 5.8 6.7 7.6 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 2,062.2 2,578.2 3,142.8 3,695·5 4,242.5 
Load Factor 58.93 60.54 57-97 61.08 60.96 
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Table # 22 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net · Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Diva. (Calendar Yra.) 
Millions I C o m m o n I p e r a h a r e 
1948 66.49 2.35 0.98 Nil. 20 5/8 - 13 7/8 
1949 69.72 1.97 0.82 Nil. 16 7/8 
- 13 
1950 78.49 5.26 2.19 0.25 20 3/8 - 13 5/8 
1951 98.30 7-23 3.02 0.50 30 - 19 
1952 118.55 8.51 3·43 0.50 28 5/8 - 22 
1953 144.47 7.92 3.20 0.50 28 3/8 - 20 5/8 
1954 169.94 7-15 2.88 0.50 40 - 21 5/8 
1955 198.61 13.31 5.32 1.00 58 - 35 1/4 
1956 228.04 14.74 . 5-17 1.00 57 1/4 - 43 1/8 
1957 262.48 9-35 3.20 1.00 51 3/4 - 27 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
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Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 
1952 z. 062.. z 
1953 2S7S . 2. 
' 
1954 314Z.8 
1955 I 36~.S 
1956 
42.42..S 
Revenue Passenger Miles (000,000) 
1952 SCI.9 .. 
1953 52 60.S" 
1954 S;J 
_$7,9 . 
1955 ~2. 61.1 
1956 s.s 60.9, 
-· 
Break-even- Ae tual - c:::J · 
Load Factor 
National Airways, Inc. 
National Airlines, a sectional, medium sized line, 
operates out of Miami, Florida. It operates long haul flights 
up the east coast and, horizontally, local routes along the 
Gulf Coast as far west as Houston. It also operates some 
shorter haul, inter-city fiights along the east coast. 
In July 1957, the Civil Aeronautics Board certified 
National to fly the Boston-New York-Miami run, making it the 
first competition of Eastern on this route. This route is 
expected to be of great value to National in years to come. 
National hopes in the future to extend service 
northwestward to Chicago and the Great Lakes region. It is 
working toward this end in its applications to the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, and feels it will have favorable results. 
National also lost a bid to extend service to the west coast, 
but, no doubt, will apply again. 
On February 8, 1957, the Federal Communications 
Commission announced the award of T.v. Channel 10 in Miami 
to Public Service Television, which is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of National Airlines. This station ·went on the air 
in August 1957, so there is no indication of its effect on 
the finances of National. There is currently a Senate in-
vestigation into this award by the FCC which may or may not 
have an effect on the ownership of the station by National 
Airlines. 
National's fleet consists of six Convair 44o's, 
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four Super H Constellations, and four Douglas DC-7B'e. 
National has on order 23 Lockheed Electra turbo-prop jet 
~1rcraft due to be delivered from April 1959 to December 1960. 
Also, six Douglas DC~8 jete are scheduled for delivery from 
December 1959 to November 1960. 
National is currently paying on a loan agreement 
from 1952 -. The unsecured notes payable to unnamed banks bear 
interest at the annual rate of 3-t %. They are in two series, 
the first payable as to principal in seven quarterly install-
mente of $546,000 beginning September 30, 1957, with a final 
installment of $534,000 on June 30, 1959. The other series 
is payable on eight quarterly installments of $231,250 be-
ginning September 30, 1959 and ending June 30, 1961. There 
are restrictions on dividends, but National , has managed to 
meet the restrictions and maintain ita dividend. 
There is a contingent liability for back taxes 
of $1,500,000. The company is contesting the tax assessment. 
National is expecting ita new aircraft received 
in 1957 to help raise fiscal 1958 earnings, according to 
Alexander Hardy, senior Vice-President. 
National is currently selling at 16 i, ita recent 
low being 13 3/4. 
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Table # 23 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 18.6 20.6 23.6 24.2 26.5 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 0.85 0.98 1.22 1.41 1.49 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 567.3 682.3 860.1 987.2 998.7 
Load Factor 64.86 60.53 61.81 65.76 59.85 
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Table # 24 
Nati onal Airways. Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Diva. (Gal endar Yrs • ) 
Millions $ C o m m o n • p e r e h a r e 
1945 7.89 d1.95 d2.59 Nil. 10 1/4 - 4 1/2 
1949 12.66 0.04 o.o4 Nil. 9 1/2 - 5 
1950 15.91 0.56 0.56 Nil. 14 1/4 - 6 7/8 
1951 24.38 2.59 2.59 0.25 17 1/4 -12 1/4 
1952 28.26 2.05 2.05 0.50 16 7/8 -11 1/2 
1953 32.91 4.03 3-99 0.50 15 1/2 -11 1/8 
1954 38.76 4 .. 47 4.42 0.60 27 -12 1/2 
1955 48. 62 3•08 3.01 0.60 27 7/8 -20 1/4 
1956 55.47 4, .. 50 4.14 
1957 56.82 3·13 3.00 1.00 30 -14 1/2 
' 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
National Airways. Inc. 
S67.3 
~82.3 
8 60./ 
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Northeast Airlines, Inc. 
Northeast is about the smallest of the domestic 
airlines, which until recently was a sectional airline 
operating mostly in New England and New York. However, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board in 1956 awarded them the third 
certificate on the lucrative Boston-New York-Miami run. 
Service to Washington was started on November 27, 1956, and 
to Florida on January 9, 1957· This certificate is good for 
five years, and subject to renewal. 
With the Boston-Miami route, Northeast went off 
the subsidy list. It was felt by the CAB that the route 
would produce enough revenue to make the subsidy unnecessary. 
Northeast was operating mostly Douglas DC-3's and 
Convairs, but with expansion has acquired some DC-6B's, most-
ly for the Boston-Miami route. Northeast has on order five 
Bristol Britannia turbo-prop jet airliners, originally 
scheduled for delivery in late 1957. However, these have 
been delayed because of lack of CAB certification of this 
type plane. Northeast intends to use this type if it can 
be certified, and has placed no orders for other type jet 
· planes. 
In December 1956, Northeast had a stock sub-
scription of 784,4o2 shares at $9.50. The company received 
about $7,000,000 from this, of which $5,500,000 was applied 
to purchase of aircraft. 
There is a credit agreement between Northeast 
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and some banks supplying $8,130,000. Loans bear 4 % interest, 
and are payable in quarterly installments beginning March 31, 
1958, and ending not later than December 31, 1962. Proceeds 
were to be used only for the purchase of Douglas DC-6B's, 
and spare parts. Restrictions were placed on dividends. 
The restrictions limit the amount of cash dividends which 
may be paid on common stock to a portion (not specifically 
given in annual report) of the net income accrued subse-
quent to December 31, 1954. 
Final figures have not been released for 1957, 
but indications are that Northeast will have a deficit of 
about #4,000,000. This would be the highest in ita history 
and compares to a deficit of $229,540 in 1956. 
Northeast states that the Florida route is profit-
able, and that in January 1958, the airline operated in the 
"black". The lose in 1957 was due to the introduction of 
Florida service, difficulty in generating the sort of 
passenger traffic required to support the enlarged operation, 
and to rising costs. 
During 1957, Northeast sold in the range of 
10 1/8 - 4 3/8. No dividend was paid. It is currently selling 
for 6. Fifty-one percent of the stock is owned by Atlas 
Corporation which is controlled by Howard Hughes. 
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Table # 25 
. 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 4.73 5.69 6.32 6.59 6.63 
Revenue 
·Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.59 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 83.7 91.4 104.2 116.5 119.3 
Load Factor 58.04 55.32 55.91 59.22 58.50 
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Table # 26 
Northeast Airlines. Ine. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions I 0 o m m o n j p e r s h a r e 
1948 . 4.88 d0.29 d0.72 Nil. 3 3/8 - 2 1/8 
1949 5-79 0.02 d0.08 Nil. 3 1/8 - 2 1/8 
1950 6.36 0.42 0.52 Nil. 5 1/2 
- 2 1/2 
1951 1·31 0.19 0.17 Nil. 6 5/8 - 4 1/4 
1952 7-49 0.22 0.21 Nil. 5 1/2 - 3 1/4 
1953 8.56 0.49 0.54 Nil. 4 3/4 
- 2 5/8 
1954 9.45 0.14 0.11 Nil. 6 3/8 - 3 1/2 
1955 10.12 0.38 0.39 Nil. 12 
- 5 1/2 
1956 10.30 d0.30 d0.17 Nil. 14 1/2 - 8 1/8 
1957 d(?) Nil. 10 1/8 - 4 3/8 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
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Northeast Airlines, Inc. 
1952 83.7 
1953 !JI. 4-
-
1954 / 04.2 
1955 116.-> 
1956 //!}.3 
Revenue Passenger Miles (000,000) 
1952 !============:==~. s-a.o 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Break-even - Actual- CJ 
Load Factor 
Northwest Airlines. Inc. 
Northwest Airlines, based in St. Paul, Minne.sota, 
is an international airline, medium in size, that flies 
routes along the northern part of the. country, from coast 
to coast. Its service extends from New York to the large 
cities near the Great Lakes, out to Montana, Oregon, and 
Washington. Its overseas operations include Alaska, Hawaii, 
Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. 
Northwest has applications before the CAB for 
routes from Los Angeles and San Francisco to areas now 
served overseas. It also would like to expand from the 
Great Lakes area to Florida, and to Washington, D.C. and 
Boston from cities now serviced in the midwest. Traffic 
density in the areas now served is light. 
Northwest has a fleet of just under 60 planes, 
most of them DC-6 and DC-7 models by Douglas, along with 
9 Boeing Stratocruisars. Northwest has ordered some jet 
engines, but apparently has not decided on a specific type 
jet as it has none on order. 
Northwest has operated without a subsidy since 
1952. 
Northwest has a bank credit agreement with a group 
of fifteen banks, located in cities serviced by Northwest, 
with Banker's Trust Co. in New York the lead bank. The 
present agreement permits the company to borrow a maximum 
of #38,500,000 through September 29, 1958, or $35,000,000 
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through December 30, 1958. The balance outstanding as of 
that date is to be paid at a rate of 20 % for the next five 
years. Interest is at 4t %. There are restrictions on dividends, 
but Northwest has managed to meet the restrictions and main-
tain the dividends. 
Final figures for 1957 are not available. Indi-
cations were that earnings would be about the aame per share 
as in 1956. It sold between 17 5/8- 9 3/8 in 1957, and 
currently is selling for 13 1/8. It maintained the eighty 
cent dividend that it paid in 1956. The yield is about 6.1. 
The present price is below book vaiue. 
Table # 27 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles (000,000) 23.2 27.8 27.0 30.9 32.5 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried (000,000) 
Revenue 
Passenger 
· Miles flown (000,000) 720.0 857.2 909.7 1,017.4 1,094.0 
Load Factor 65.3 59-7 60.3 59·7 
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Table # 28 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Divs. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions $ C o m m o n $ p e r a h a r e 
1948 35.15 d0.79 dl.51 Nil. 17 1/8 - 8 1/4 
1949 39-97 0.78 o.4o Nil. 12 - 7 
1950 52.46 0.27 d0.22 Nil. 14 7/8 - 8 
1951 54.69 1.79 1.64 Nil. 16 -12 1/8 
1952 61.55 1.79 1.65 Nil. 16 3/4 - 11 1/4 
1953 66.14 1.94 1.84 Nil. 14 1/2 - 8 1/2 
1954 63.60 2.42 2.38 Nil. 19 3/4 - 7 1/2 
1955 71-36 2.12 1.80 0.60 26 3/8 -16 3/8 
1956 76.48 3.23 2.18 0.80 19 3/8 -14 
1957 83.43 4.82 3·56 0.80 17 5/8 - 9 3/8 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1952 
1953 
1954 
.1955 
1956 
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Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
72.0,0 
. 
J 8.0.2. 
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/ 0 17-1 
/ 094; 
Revenue Passenger Miles (000,000) 
1==============================~~~3 
~ ........ -. .... m s6 
Break-even - Actual- c:::J 
Load Factor 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
Trans World Airlines is one of the big four 
domestic airlines, which has also spread its service to 
around the world. Its domestic service is mostly from coast 
to coast with intermediary stops in between. The foreign 
routes carry Trans World to major European cities, the 
Middle East, India, and the Philippines. T.W.A. has joined 
with Northwest Airlines to offer round-the-world air service. 
T.W.A. has also been certified to fly the trans-polar route 
to London and Paris. Although it goes far overseas, 80 % 
of the passenger miles flown were domestic in nature. 
Domestic routes accounted for 3,266,510,000 passenger miles, 
while international routes accounted for 710,895,000 passen-
ger miles. 
T.W.A. has recently put into service 8 new Super 
G Constellation and 25 Lockheed four engine aircraft, (not 
jets). T.W.A. has on order 33 Boeing 707 jet airliners. This 
order was recently increased to 33, having been for 8 when 
originally placed. Also on order are 30 Convair 880 medium 
jets. The jets were actually ordered by Howard Hughes and 
the Hughes Tool Company. However, T.W.A. is under obligation 
to buy them from Hughes Tool. 
Hughes Tool owns about 78 to 80 % of Trans World 
Airlines, and T.W.A. is heavily indebted to Hughes Tool. 
On December 18, 1956, the CAB approved a $10,000,000 
credit by Bughes Tool to T.W.A. for its use as temporary 
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operating capital through April 30, 1958. All loans made 
were unsecured notes, bearing interest at the then prevailing 
prime rate. 
On the purchase of aircraft, T.W.A. is obligated 
to acquire the aircraft and spare parts. Furchase price to 
T.W.A. is the aggregate cost of aircraft and spare parts to 
Hughes plus ·3. % per annum on advance payments made by Hughes. 
Ther e are also sinking fund payments of #1,500,000 
semi-annually to and including June 1, 1969. These payments 
are required for the Equipment Mortgage Bonde. 
T.W.A. suffered a loss in 1957, even though revenues 
were up. Profits do not seem in prospect in the near future. 
The present price is below book· value. No dividend was paid 
in 1957. During 1957, T.W.A. sold in the range of 20 1/4 -
9 1/4. It ie currently selling at 12 5/8. 
Table # 29 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 71.2 83.6 89.1 97.2 107.5 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.4 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 2,324.0 2,888.0 3,212.0 3,502.0 3,977.0 
Load Factor ~ 73.7 70.3 67.4 64.8 64.1 
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Table # 30 
Trans World Airlines. Inc. 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range · 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yre.) 
Millions $ C o m m o n $ p e r e h a r e 
1948 101.05 dl.28 d0.57 Nil. 20 5/8 8 3/4 
1949 105.65 3.73 1.49 Nil . 15 5/8 - 9 1/8 
1950 116.97 7.83 2.94 Nil. 23 3/8 -14 
1951 142.26 7.66 2.87 Nil. 25 3/8 -17 1/4 
1952 160.70 7.66 2.30 Nil. 21 5/8 -14 7/8 
1953 187.22 5.06 1.52 Nil. 20 1/8 -12 3/4 
1954 203.67 10.34 3.10 Nil. 30 5/8 -13 1/8 
1955 217.43 5.41 1.62 Nil. 35 1/2 -22 1/8 
1956 240.39 (2.32) {0.70) Nil. 28 7/8 -16 1/2 
1957 d{?) Nil. 20 1/4 - 9 1/4 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - . Deficit 
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Break-even - Actual - c::J 
Load Factor 
United Air Lines 
United Airlines is the second largest domestic 
airline. It operates along the east coast from Boston to 
Washington, along the west coast from vancouver to San Diego, 
and across the country coast to coast. It also has an over-
seas route to Honolulu. It has no service to the south or 
southwest. 
United operates without subsidy and is the largest 
carrier of air mail. 
United has a large fleet, consisting of about 
75 planes of the DC-6 type, about 45 of the DC-7 type, and 
about 55 Convairs. United originally did not order any turbo 
props or medium-sized jets. It was the first airline to order 
jets, and ordered 30 DC-8's. This order has since been in-
creased to 4o. In December 1957, W.A. Patterson, president 
of United Airlines, announced plans for purchase of 51 Boeing 
720's - the Boeing medium-sized jet. Eleven have been ordered, 
the other forty will be as soon as conditions warrant it. He 
also said that United hoped to be "all jet" by 1965. 
United Airlines has a financial arrangement with 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, The Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, and Mutual Life Insurance Company of 
New York, dated December 22, 1955. Under the terms of this 
arrangement, United can sell them $120,000,000 of 4 % 
sinking fund debentures. These funds remain available until 
March 1, 1959. Sinking fund payments start in 1967, and pro-
vide for final retirement of these obligations in 1981. 
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United also has a credit agreement with 38 banks, 
made in December 1955, that makes available $30,000,000 as 
needed prior to January 1, 1961. This would be more for 
. working capital, whereas the debentures for the insurance 
companies would be for aircraft and parts mostly. 
United, like other airlines, saw its earnings 
drop, United's being almost one half in 1957 ($2.38) of 
what they were 1n 1956, when they were $4.55. Consequently, 
the dividend was cut from 1.50 to .so plus 7 % stock. Price 
earnings ratio was 11, and yield was 1.9. United is current-
ly selling for 27 7/8. 
Table # 31 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 74.8 85.2 98.3 110.8 121.6 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000} 3.45 3·95 4.78 5.57 6.27 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 2,403.0 2,717.0 3,327.0 3,986.0 4,519.0 
Load Factor 72.7 68.4 66.4 67.7 67.1 
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Table # 32 
United Air Lines 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions I C o m m o n $ p e r s h a r e 
1948 83.2 dl.07 d0.72 Nil. 19 1/4 - 9 5/8 
1949 91.6 2.25 0.88 Nil. 14 3/4 -10 1/4 
1950 104.1 6.43 2.90 0.75 24 3/8 -13 3/8 
1951 127.8 8.56 3.58 1.50 35 5/8 -22 5/8 
1952 159.0 10.68 4.03 1.50 33 7/8 -24 5/8 
1953 173.0 9.07 3.28 1.50 32 1/4 -21 1/4 
1954 200.7 9.62 3.52 1.50 38 3/8 -21 1/2 
1955 235.6 11.24 . 3-36 1.50 49 1/2 -34 1/4 
1956 262.8 14.68 4.55 1.50 44 3/4 -35 3/8 
1957 281.9 7·59 2.38 o.5o# 43 1/4 -18 1/8 
Source: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
d - Deficit 
# plus 7 % stock 
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Break-even - Actual- c=J 
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Western Air Lines 
Western Air Lines is a medium sized airline, 
sectional in nature, with most of its routes of a north-
south nature in the Western area of the United States. It 
flies along the coast, and also north-south routes just east 
of the Rocky Mountains. Western also has a route from the 
Twin Cities to Denver, and is trying to extend to Chicago. 
In July of 1957, it was awarded the Los Angeles to Mexico 
City route. On December 1, 1957, the CAB gave it the Denver 
to San Diego route. These long haul routes should prove 
beneficial and relieve seasonal imbalance. 
Western operates a fleet of about 30 planes, about 
half of them are of the DC-6 type. By mid 1958, the company 
expects to have about twenty-five of this type. Western feels 
that this type plane is ideal for its type of operation, 
taking into consideration the terrain over which it flies, 
the area serviced and length of flights. Western has modest-
ly ordered nine Lockheed Electra turbo prop planes with 
delivery scheduled for 1959-1960. 
In 1956, Western successfully effected a public 
offering of #5,000,000 in 4i % convertible subordinated 
debentures due June 1, 1971. Western obtained a long term 
-
unsecured loan from the Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association of $6,000,000 at 4 %. It has also arranged 
for the future sales of long term unsecured notes to Prudential 
Insurance Company of America in the amount of $12,000,000 at 
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4i % interest. The usual restrictions on capital and dividends 
apply as well as the usual commitment fees. 
A final earnings figure is not available yet. 
However, best estimates show the earnings between $2.70 and 
$2.83 per common share. Operating revenues would be around 
#42,200,000 with net income of $2,400,000. During 1957, the 
stock sold between 25 3/4 - 17 1/2. It is currently selling 
for 22 7/8. The dividend was1 .8o plus stock. 
Table # 33 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956# 
Revenue miles 
(000,000) 12.6 14.4 15.8 18.3 14.8 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Carried 
(000,000) 0.77 0.84 0.83 1.09 0.93 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Miles flown 
(000,000) 298.9 359-9 402.3 514.7 458.1 
Load Factor 66.0 58.6 55-7 59.1 61.9 
# Operations suspended. from January 9 to March 22 because of 
strike. 
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Table # 34 
Western Air Lines 
Total 
Oper. Net Price Range 
Revs. Income Earns. Dive. (Calendar Yrs.) 
Millions $ C o m m o n $ p e r s h a r e 
1948 10.46 0.13 0.26 Nil. 10 1/2 
- 5 1/8 
1949 11.53 0.43 0.82 Nil. 8 1/8 - 5 
1950 14.25 0.75 1.43 Nil. 13 3/8 - 7 1/4 
1951 16.28 1.39 2.53 0.50 16 -11 3;4 
1952 18.60 1.23 1.72 0.60 15 5/8 - 9 3/4 
1953 22.88 1.18 1.66 0.60 12 3/8 - 8 3/8 
1954 24.48. 1.46 2.04 0.60 18 1/4 - 8 3/4 
1955 31.04 1.98 2.67 0.90 25 3/4 -16 7/8 
1956 28.19 3.04 3.91 o.8o 25 3/8 -18 3/8 
1957 2.70 0.80 25 3/4 -17 1/2 
§ource: 
Standard and Poor's Industry Survey 
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1953 
1954 
1955 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS. 
At the start of this final chapter, some mention 
should be made of managem~nt. Obviously, as a student, this 
writer is in no position to evaluate the management of the 
airlines. From reading and observations, it seems that the 
best evaluation that appears is the one prepared annually 
by Forbes Magazine. In their issue of January 1, 1958, 
Forbes rated the management of nine of the twelve domestic 
airlines. The figures for the other three were compiled by 
this writer, as far as possible. 
Management is vital to an analysis of an airline. 
With top management, an airline will be profitable and grow. 
With only mediocre management, the company will be just one 
more airline. This matter of management is presented at this 
time, because it is so important and should be considered in 
reaching conclusions. 
Forbes rates management on the basis of 
a) Profitability 
1) Return on Equity: How much net profit does 
management earn on each dollar of common 
stockholder's equity? (Netjshr.+ bk.val.) 
2) Operating profit margin: How much operating 
profit does management earn on each dollar 
of sales? (Op. profit+ sales). 
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3) Net profit margin: How much does the 
company earn after taxes on each dollar 
of sales? (Net+ sale~). 
b) Growth 
1) Equity growth: (5 year change) How fast 
has management made stockholder's equity 
grow? (% growth in bk.val./shr. for latest 
5 year period). 
2) Dilution factor: How fast has earnings 
per share grown compared with total net? 
(5 .year growth in net/shr. as% of growth 
total net profit). 
c) Payout and Plowback 
1) Dividend payout: (5 year average) How 
generous has management been with dividends? 
(Dividends as% of net). 
2) Reinvestment results: How much new profit 
has been generated out of each dollar of 
reinvested earnings? (5 year growth in net + 
5 year plowback per share). 
d) Debt and Interest 
1) Leverage factor: How much capital does one 
dollar of equity command? (Total capital-
ization+ common equity). 
2) Average interest charges: How much does 
management have to pay on average to borrow 
~· money? (Annual intere.st charges + debt). 
103 

105 
As can be seen from Table # 35, three of the big 
four airlines have management ratings of 90 or better. These 
three are thesame three that are in the best financial con-
dition, show the best profits, and are returning good dividends. 
The decision on whether an airline stock is worth 
buying or not is based on the financial position·. One of the 
key factors in the future financial position is the jet plane. 
This writer feels that jets will benefit the airlines in the 
long run. There is much in the near future that presents a 
dark picture such as the high costs and the heavy financing 
burdens. Profit will be down for some time. Therefore, if 
stocks are purchased for high profits and high dividends, 
airline stocks are not the ·wisest purchase. 
The airlines will show growth, but it is not the 
growth that will cause any extensive appreciation in stock 
value. Airline stocks have been depressed for quite some time. 
In fact, when the Dow-Jones averages took a sharp drop start-
ing last July, airline stocks were depressed, and while they 
did go down with the market, their drop in value was com-
paratively minor. When the market started to show some rise 
this winter, airline stocks showed only minor gains. In my 
opinion, because of their heavy financial burdens, the air-
lines will find that their stocks will not appreciate greatly 
in the near future, though they will follow the market. 
But the picture is not completely dark. It should 
never be forgotten in looking at the .airlines that they are 
in a regulated industry, and the CAB governs and regulates 
the airline·s with an iron fist. If the lines start showing 
losses, the CAB will take steps to see that they come out 
of the "red". The CAB will not allow the airlines to operate 
without a profit for any. long period of time. In effect, this 
means that airline stocks will have a "floor" under them, 
and give some safety to the stockholder. 
Because the air transport industry is a growing 
industry, and airline stocks are growth stocks, some in-
vestors would consider these securities · for dollar-averaging. 
This plan, where a stated amount is invested periodically, 
regardless of price, is a method of accumulating a capital 
fund. Usually, securities selected are those that seem to 
hold promise over the long period of time, which is true 
of airline stocks. Dollar-averaging is usually done, also, 
because the price of a stock is expected to fluctuate over 
a wide range. In my opinion, while the stocks of the air-
lines are depressed, the range in price will not be very 
large in the near future. Because of the growth, this writer 
believes that airline stocks · might be ·. considered for dollar-
averaging, but also is convinced that other approaches should 
be considered. 
There is · also an investor approach based on buy-
ing depressed stocks, on the assumption that the price can 
only go up; and will do so. Stock purchases should be made 
on the basis of expected ·future earnings, and in buying 
depressed stocks, a strong financial position is vital. I 
do not feel that the airlines are now in a strong financial 
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position and would not recommend buying airline stocks on 
the depressed industry theory. 
Standard and Poor's, in their most recent advisory, 
did not recommend buying any of the airline stocks, though 
it did recommend holding any stock currently in portfolios, 
for all airlines. 
Three investment writers for Forbes Magazine have 
recently come out in favor of airline stocks. In the December 
15, 1957 issue, L.O. Hooper states that he believes they will 
soon start upwards. He claims the best buys would be American, 
Eastern, and United, but that National, Delta; and Braniff also 
have some merit. He considers ·· the ·-rest quite speculative .• In 
the January 15, 1958 issue, Joseph D. Goodman states that 
he feels the airline stocks have reached attractive buying 
levels. He makes the blanket statement. and does not designate 
specific companies. Mr. Heinz Biel, the third writer to turn 
to airlines, states in the February 15, 1958 issue that he 
considers American, Eastern, and United as s.ound business-
men's risks. 
It is my opinion , that American Airlines, Eastern 
Airlines, and United Airlines warrant consideration for 
possible purchase of their stock, even by the conservative. 
They have had good earnings in the past, have satisfactory 
operating ratios, and have made sound financial arrangements 
for conversion· to jet planes. Apparently, the insurance 
companies are of the same opinion, as they have readily 
granted the loans. Perhaps, because of their. strength, they 
107 
have been able to obtain long term loans at reasonable in-
terest rates, and I am sure that the length of the terms adds 
to their strength. 
The securities of the nine smaller airlines · have 
some merit, but mostly for the investor who likes to speculate 
or "take a long shot". They will have many ups and downs, 
before they show good profits. 
The other major airline; . T.W.A., has . close financial 
arrangements with Hughes Tool, and because. of these arrange-
ments, I am skeptical of it and would hesi ta.te about buying 
it. 
I am convinced that the long-range future prospects 
of the airlines are good for two reasons, - first, the jet 
plane, and secondly, the growth factor. However, the immediate 
future holds many problems that will result .in narrow profit 
margins. But once these problems are overcome, the .profits 
and value of the securities will rise. 
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